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ERISA PREEMPTION DOCTRINE AS HEALTH
POLICY
JoshuaP. Booth*
LarryL Palmer**

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") 1 was
passed by a Democratic Congress and signed by a Republican President,
Gerald Ford, in 1974. Since that time, it has been a source of confusion
and debate among scholars. The primary focus of the Act, as suggested
by its title, was to protect employee pension plans. To this end, ERISA
provisions regulate a number of aspects of employee pension planssuch as minimum funding requirements 2 and specific reporting and
disclosure requirements. 3
However, ERISA's scope goes far beyond retirement benefits. In
addition to pension plans, ERISA also regulates "employee welfare
benefit plan[s,]" which include employer-provided health care
benefits--defined as plans designed to provide, "through the purchase of
insurance or otherwise, . . . medical, surgical, or hospital care or
benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness,"-as well as a range of
other employee benefits as diverse as disability benefits, day care
centers, and scholarship funds.4
ERISA's broad scope has been particularly problematic to courts
and scholars trying to explain the Act's preemption provision. Section
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1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2006)).
2. Id. § 1013 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 412).
3. Id. §§ 101-07 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-27).
4. Id. § 3(1) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)).
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514 5 states that ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they.., relate to any employee benefit plan."6 In an early ERISA case,
the U.S. Supreme Court suggested that a statute could relate to ERISA
plans in one of two ways, by having either "a connection with or
reference to such a plan."7 These terms, however, are as vague as the
statutory language itself, and neither courts nor scholars seem to have
been able to clearly state the meaning of this provision. As Peter
Jacobson notes: "Finding coherence from the myriad of ERISA opinions
is quite difficult. At best, ERISA doctrine is neither predictable nor
stable; it is,8 rather, largely muddled and most opinions are
impenetrable."
Part of this difficulty arises from the fact that many of the scholars
who have commented on the subject have focused on employment law
and pension benefits-not on health care policy. These scholars attempt
to take the framework of preemption created in the context of pensions
and other benefits and apply it directly to health care benefits. This
practice is, perhaps, understandable. After all, ERISA has a single
preemption provision that purportedly applies to both types of statutes.
A highly textual approach to statutory interpretation, therefore, might
reasonably lead an interpreter to apply the same preemption framework
to both types of statute.
We propose that courts typically apply a more pragmatic form of
statutory interpretation. As described by scholars such as William
Eskridge and his collaborators, courts do not typically adopt a single
interpretive framework to be applied in all situations. 9 Rather, courts
utilize a number of interpretive techniques. Which techniques will be
applied, and how they will be applied, will depend upon the institutional
arrangements and policy considerations in a given area of law, as well as
the particular court making the decision.
Under this framework, the assumption that courts will mechanically
apply the standards of preemption from other contexts to health care
ordinances ignores the unique aspects of health policy and the unique
institutional arrangements involved. Health care presents a very different
institutional structure than pension benefits. Put another way, the
relationship between various institutions, including private market
institutions, the courts, state governments, and the federal government,
5. Section 514 of the public law can be found at 29 U.S.C. § 1144.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 1144.
7. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983).
8. Peter D. Jacobson, The Role of ERISA Preemption in Health Reform: Opportunities and
Limits, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS (SUPPLEMENT 2) 88, 91 (2009).
9. See infra Part III.A.
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will naturally be different in the health care context than in other
contexts. This will lead courts to apply different interpretive techniques.
Thus, we believe there is a need for a new way of looking at ERISA
preemption of state and local health care statutes that takes into account
these unique features of health policy.
This need is emphasized by two recent federal circuit court
decisions. In 2007, the Fourth Circuit found a Maryland Statute
requiring employers with more than 10,000 employees to make certain
health care expenditures for their employees to be preempted in Retail
Industry Leaders Ass 'n v. Fielder.10 Two years later, the Ninth Circuit
found that a San Francisco ordinance that required employers to make
certain expenditures for their employees was not preempted by ERISA
in Golden Gate Restaurant Ass 'n v. San Francisco.11 The Supreme
Court declined to review Golden Gate on June 28, 2010.12
Although the two cases present a number of unique institutional
considerations, the distinct outcomes cannot easily be explained by most
common interpretations of ERISA. This Article proposes that the
different outcomes are best explained by looking at ERISA's preemption
of health care statutes in light of health policy.
Part II describes the two cases and the apparent conflict between
them. It goes on to describe how preemption frameworks imported from
pension/disability and other contexts cannot adequately explain the
distinct results in these cases.
Part III provides a brief overview of the dynamic form of statutory
interpretation that we believe courts apply in dealing with health policy
matters. We then discuss how this is likely to result in different judicial
methodology for determining preemption of pension laws and health
care laws. Specifically, in the health care arena, courts are more likely to
eschew a textualist approach in favor of a more dynamic approach that
looks at the health policy background in which a statute operates.
Part IV examines what it means to look at ERISA preemption
through the lens of health policy. We begin by discussing the health
policy context at the time that ERISA was enacted. We then give brief
examples of how health policy and institutional concerns have affected
Supreme Court decisions on ERISA preemption. We then list some
specific health policy implications of ERISA preemption.
Finally, in Part V, we return to the Fourth and Ninth Circuit cases
and examine these decisions-and the Supreme Court's decision not to

10.

475 F.3d 180, 183 (4th Cir. 2007).

11. 546 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3497 (2010).
12. Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 130 S. Ct. 3497 (2010).
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grant certiorari in Golden Gate-in light of the analytical methods
discussed in Parts III and IV.
II.

AN APPARENT "CONFLICT" BETWEEN THE FOURTH AND NINTH
CIRCUITS

A.

Maryland's FairShare Act

1. The Statute
In 2006 the Maryland General Assembly passed the Fair Share
Health Care Fund Act (the "Fair Share Act").' 3 The Fair Share Act
required employers with at least ten thousand Maryland employees to
spend at least eight percent of their payroll on health care for their
employees-either through an ERISA plan or through other
expenditures.' 4 If the employer fell short, it was required to pay the
difference to the state.' 5
The Fair Share Act was targeted exclusively at one employer, WalMart Stores, Inc. ("Wal-Mart"). 16 By its terms, the Fair Share Act
applied only to for-profit employers with more than ten thousand
employees in Maryland.' 7 Only two employers fell under this definition,
and one of these was already in compliance with the Fair Share Act and
had actually lobbied for it.' 8
Shortly after the passage of the Fair Share Act, the Retail Industry
Leaders Association ("RILA"), an association of which Wal-Mart is a
prominent member, filed suit, arguing that the Fair Share Act was
preempted by ERISA. 19 The district court agreed and granted RILA's
motion for summary judgment, and Maryland appealed to the Fourth
Circuit. 20
2. The Court's Analysis
Maryland put forth a number of arguments that the Fair Share Act
should not be preempted, all of which were rejected by the Fourth
Circuit. Maryland's primary argument was that the Fair Share Act gave

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Fielder,475 F.3d at 183.
Id. at 183, 196.
Id. at 183.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 185.
Id.
Id. at 186.
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covered employers (i.e. Wal-Mart) alternatives to establishing an ERISA
plan.2 1 While the statute may have affected Wal-Mart's choices by
providing certain incentives, it did not force any specific action. 2
Maryland pointed out that the Supreme Court had upheld a number of
state statutes that influenced, without forcing, employer choices.23
In developing this argument, Maryland pointed to a number of
alternative avenues that employers had for complying with the statute. 24
For example, Wal-Mart could comply with the spending requirements
either by setting up on-site medical clinics for its employees or by
contributing to an employee's health savings account-neither of which
would be governed by ERISA.25
The court determined that neither of these were "meaningful
alternatives by which an employer can increase its healthcare spending
to comply with the Fair Share Act." 26 For an on-site medical clinic to
escape ERISA's scope, it would have to limit its activities to "the
treatment of minor injuries or illness or rendering first aid., 27 Health
savings accounts would be an option only in regards to employees who
chose to enroll in a high-deductible health plan. 28 Given the low
likelihood that Wal-Mart would be able to meet its spending requirement
through either method, they did not provide a "meaningful avenue" for
29
Wal-Mart to meet its obligations under the Fair Share Act.
Maryland next pointed out that employers had yet another
alternative-paying the required amount directly to the state. 3' This,
Maryland argued, gave Wal-Mart a viable alternative that did not require
any alteration of its ERISA plans. 31 The court rejected this argument,
based on what it perceived to be an employer's inevitable choices. 32
Given the choice between increasing its health care benefits and giving

21. Id.
at 194-95.
22. ld.at 195.
23. Id. Maryland relied, in particular, on New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co. Id.; see Travelers, 514 U.S. 645 (1995). In Travelers, the

Court approved a statute that gave employers a strong incentive to provide health care benefits
through Blue Cross and Blue Shield as opposed to other providers. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659. The

Court ruled that, despite the law's rather clear tendency to affect ERISA plans, its effect on such
plans was indirect, and was therefore not preempted. Id. at 662.
24. Fielder,475 F.3d at 196.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.at 197.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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money to the state, any rational employer would choose the former.33
Providing increased benefits to employees provides an employer with
certain advantages, such as improved ability to recruit and retain
employees. 34 The state-payment option would provide no such benefits,
and an employer would simply look at it as money wasted.35
Thus, the court concluded, the Fair Share Act did not simply
provide certain incentives or influence employer choices. 36 Rather, the
Fair Share Act was a direct mandate that a specific employer increase its
compensation under ERISA plans.37 Such a direct mandate, unlike the
incentives upheld in previous cases, was preempted by ERISA. 38
B.

San FranciscoHealth Care Security Ordinance

1. The Ordinance
In July 2006, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors passed a law
that was, in many ways, similar to the Maryland law. 39 The San
Francisco Health Care Security Ordinance ("HCSO") has two major
components, the "Health Access Program" and an employer contribution
requirement.4a
The Health Access Plan ("HAP") is a "[c]ity-administered health
care program 4 1 designed as a way for uninsured San Francisco
residents to obtain health care.42 It provides enrollees with "medical
services with an emphasis on wellness, preventive care[,] and innovative
service delivery. 4 3 The HAP is open to any uninsured resident, 4 and
45
enrollees pay participation fees based on their ability to pay.

33. Id.at 193.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 195, 197.
37. Id. at 197.
38. Id. Note that following the Fourth Circuit's decision in Fielder, but prior to the Ninth
Circuit's decision discussed below, a district court in New York found a county statute very similar
to Maryland's Fair Share Act preempted. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Suffolk Cnty., 497 F. Supp.
2d 403, 416, 418 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). The court relied heavily on the reasoning in Fielder.Id. at 41618.
39. Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 546 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2008).
40.

S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 14.1-3 (2006); Golden Gate, 546 F.3d at 642.

41.
42.
43.
44.

Golden Gate, 546 F.3d at 642.
S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 14.2(a).
Id. § 14.2(0.
Id. § 14.2(c).

45.

Id. § 14.2(d).
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The second part of the HCSO (and the only part challenged in the
lawsuit) is the employer contribution requirement. a6 Covered
employers-meaning employers with at least twenty employees
performing work in San Francisco-are required to spend at least a
certain amount (between $1.17 and $1.76, depending on the employer's
size) per employee work-hour for health care on behalf of their
employees.47 Such contributions can take a number of forms, including
contributions to a health savings account, reimbursements directly from
the employer to the employee, or contributions to an employee health
plan. 8 Finally, an employer may meet the requirement by paying the
amount to the HAP (the "city-payment" option).4 9 If the employer elects
to pay the city, its employees will be eligible to enroll in the HAP at a
reduced cost.50

Shortly after the ordinance was passed, the Golden Gate Restaurant
Association filed a complaint, arguing that the employer-contribution
requirement was preempted by ERISA.5 1 The district court agreed and
entered judgment for the Association. 52 The city appealed to the Ninth
Circuit, which concluded that the ordinance was not preempted and
reversed. 53

2. The Court's Analysis
In contrast with the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Fielder, which
began with a discussion of ERISA case law, 54 the Ninth Circuit's
opinion began by looking at the specific effects that the HCSO was
likely to have on employers. 55 The court described several different
categories of employers-including employers that provide no health
benefits to their employees, employers that provide adequate health
insurance to all their employees, and employers that provide partial
coverage or only cover a portion of their employees. 5 6 The court then
detailed what an employer within each category would have to do to
come into compliance with the ordinance.5 7 Significantly, the court

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Golden Gate, 546 F.3d at 643.
S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 14.1(b)(3), (8), (15); Golden Gate, 546 F.3d at 644.
S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 14. 1(b)(7)(a)-(c); Golden Gate, 546 F.3d at 644.
S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 14.1(b)(7)(e); Golden Gate, 546 F.3d at 644-45.
Golden Gate, 546 F.3d at 645.
Id. 642-43.
Id. at 643.
Id.
Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 190-93 (4th Cir. 2007).
Golden Gate, 546 F.3d at 645-46.
Id
Id. at 646.
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pointed out that, in any category, an employer "may choose to leave
their ERISA plans intact and unaltered., 58 Every employer covered by
the ordinance had options available that
did not require it to add, alter, or
59
increase utilization of ERISA plans.
The Golden Gate Restaurant Association's primary argument was
that the ordinance had an impermissible connection with employers'
ERISA plans. 60 The court rejected this argument, citing several Supreme
Court cases describing what constituted a connection. 61 These cases, at
least by the court's narrative, seem to define a "connection" in terms of
the degree to which an employer is able to make its own decisions
regarding the type of benefits it will provide its employees. 62 The
Supreme Court had found impermissible connections in statutes that
' 63
"'bind[] ERISA plan administrators to a particular choice of rules[,]'
or statutes that "'prohibit[] employers from structuring their employee
benefit plans' in a particular manner
or 'which require[] employers to
64
benefits."'
specific
employees
pay
Unlike the laws described in these cases, the San Francisco
ordinance "does not require any employer to adopt an ERISA plan or
other health plan[,] [n]or does it require any employer to provide specific
benefits. 65 Rather, employers can "structur[e] their employee benefit
plans in a variety of ways and need not pay employees specific
benefits. 66 Although an employer may be influenced by the ordinance
to adopt or 67change an ERISA plan, "such influence is entirely
permissible.

'

3. Comparison to Maryland Law
Finally, the court addressed the apparent conflict between its
decision and the Fourth Circuit's decision in Fielder. Most important
was the Fourth Circuit's finding that the Fair Share Act created no
"meaningful alternatives" for Wal-Mart but to increase its contributions
to ERISA plans. 68 Under the Fourth Circuit's analysis, the state-payment
58.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
(1983)).
65.
66.
67.
68.
2007)).

Id.

Id.
See id.
at 654.
See id. at 655-56.
Id.
Id. at 655 (quoting Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001)).
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97
Id.
Id.at 656 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
See id.at 660 (quoting Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 196 (4th Cir.
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option was not a real option, because no rational employer would choose
69
it. San Francisco's city-payment option, however, interacted with the
HAP in a way that made it a more "meaningful alternative" for
employers. 7 ° When an employer makes contributions to the city, its
employees are eligible for discounted enrollment in the HAP, providing
a direct benefit to the employer that was lacking in the Maryland
statute.71 The HCSO, unlike the Maryland statute, did not "effectively
mandate[]" any given outcome. 2 The existence of these reasonable
alternatives saved the ordinance from preemption.
C. Inability of Common ERISA Interpretationsto Distinguish These
Cases

Interpretations of ERISA based on pension and disability law
cannot adequately explain the distinct outcomes in these two cases. For
example, Edward Zelinsky describes a preemption framework based
largely on Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 73 and other non-health care
cases.74 His broad conclusion is that "ERISA preemption effectively
prevents the states from experimenting in the health care arena by
blocking state legislation relating to employer-provided health care."7 5
This conclusion is directly contradicted by the Ninth Circuit's
subsequent decision and the Supreme Court's decision not to grant
certiorari.
We believe that Zelinsky's failure to foresee a situation in which
the courts might uphold a statute that directly relates to employerprovided care arises from the fact that he assumes the courts will apply
the same preemption standards in health care cases that they do in other
contexts. For example, Zelinsky seems to assume that the same "theory"
of preemption should explain how courts should deal with statutes
regarding beneficiaries following divorce and comprehensive health
reform, such as that undertaken in Massachusetts. 76
Zelinsky acknowledges-as any ERISA scholar must-that the
term "relate[s] to" cannot be taken in its most literal sense, or virtually

at 659-60 (citing Fielder,475 F.3d at 193).
69. See id.
70. See id. at 660.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 660-61 (quoting Fielder,475 F.3d at 193).
73. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
74. See Edward A. Zelinsky, The New Massachusetts Health Law: Preemption and
Experimentation,49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 229, 250-53 (2007).
75. Id.at 234.
76. Id. at 260-61.
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any state or local health care regulation could be preempted. 7 However,
because of his reliance on cases such as Shaw, his analysis of whether a
given statute "relates" to an ERISA regulated plan seems to rest
primarily on how "direct" the relationship is. 78 For example, in
comparing the Maryland statute at issue in Fielder to Massachusetts'
health care reform statute, he assumes that the Massachusetts law more
strongly relates to ERISA plans because the Massachusetts law more
"explicitly describes employers' ERISA regulated medical plans., 79 The
fact that, in its operation, the Massachusetts law is likely to be much less
coercive to employers than the Maryland law, is not relevant to this
analysis. 80

This interpretation of "relate to," while certainly logical from a
textualist perspective, cannot explain ERISA case law in the health care
context. It certainly does nothing to explain the different outcomes in
Fielder and Golden Gate. To distinguish the cases, we need a new way
of understanding ERISA preemption as it applies to state and local
health care laws. This involves a more dynamic form of statutory
interpretation.
III.

DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

We believe that courts usually apply a more dynamic approach to
interpreting ERISA. This approach assumes there is a certain level of
interaction between courts, Congress, and the administrative agencies to
arrive at the correct "institutional balance."
A.

Method of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation

William Eskridge (often in conjunction with Philip Frickey) is
perhaps the foremost advocate of what he refers to as "dynamic statutory
interpretation."81 He contrasts this method of interpretation with a
number of textualist or "foundationalist ' 82 theories which "treat statutes
77.

See id. at 251-52.

78. See id. at 256, 264.
79. Id. at 257.
80. Zelinsky's conclusion can be contrasted with that of Amy Monahan, who concludes that
"[u]nlike Maryland's Act, which has a very strong 'pay' provision, Massachusetts's fair share
contribution law has a weak 'pay' provision-arguably allowing it to survive an ERISA preemption
challenge." Amy B. Monahan, Pay or Play Laws, ERISA Preemption, and Potential Lessons from
Massachusetts,55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1203, 1205 (2007).
81. See generally WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

(1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic StatutoryInterpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987);
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretationas PracticalReasoning, 42
STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990).
82. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 81, at 324-25.
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as static texts." 83 Such theories incorrectly assume that "the legislature
84
fixes the meaning of a statute on the date the statute is enacted.
Eskridge attempts to take a more pragmatic approach to statutory
interpretation. This approach recognizes that, "[a]s society changes,
adapts to the statute, and generates new variations of the problem which
gave rise to the statute, the unanticipated gaps and ambiguities [in the
original statute] proliferate. 8 5
In light of this, a statutory interpreter should not look simply at the
text and legislative history of the statute. Rather, an interpreter must
consider at least "three different perspectives, no one of which will
always control.",86 These are (1) the "textual perspective[,]" which
focuses on the statutory text; (2) the "historical perspective[,]" which
focuses on legislative history, compromises reached, and the
circumstances surrounding the enactment of the statute; and (3) the
"evolutive perspective[,]" which analyzes how the statute has changed
and the way in which the relevant societal and legal environment has
changed.87
Which perspective will control in any given case is dependent on a
number of factors. For example, "[w]hen the statutory text clearly
answers the interpretive question,

. . .

it normally will be the most

important consideration., 88 When strict adherence to the text creates
"highly unreasonable consequences[J" however, then an interpreter
should consider the historical perspective. 89 The evolutive perspective is
most important "when the statutory text is not clear and the original
legislative expectations have been overtaken by subsequent changes in
society." 90

Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule offer yet another factor that
could affect a court's interpretive method-the court's perception of its
own institutional capacity, compared to that of other political branches,
to answer important questions of policy. 91 Where a judge sees the courts
as having little capability to decide important issues, the judge is likely
to take a more formal approach to interpretation, leaving policy issues to

83. Eskridge, supra note 81, at 1479.
84. Id.at 1480.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1483.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1483-84.
90. Id.at 1484.
91. See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretationand Institutions, 101 MICH. L.
REv. 885, 890 (2003).
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the legislature.9 2 If, however, a judge perceives that the legislative and
executive branches are either unable or unwilling to actively address
judge to take a more active and
policy questions, we might expect that
93
inclusive approach to interpretation.
One of the most important implications of this type of dynamic
statutory interpretation is that interpretation is likely to proceed
differently in different fields of substantive law.94 Most importantly for
our purposes, ERISA's preemption provision is likely to be interpreted
differently in the health care context than it would be in the pension
benefit context.
This type of analysis is generally lacking in the scholarship on
ERISA preemption. Courts and scholars tend to lump both types of cases
together without considering that the distinct institutional contexts of
health care and pensions might lead to distinct interpretive techniques.
B.

Contrastof Pension/DisabilityBenefits and Health Care

This tendency to import preemption standards from other arenas
into the health care context is an understandable textual approach to
section 514-which certainly does not mention a distinction between
different fields of law. 95 However, the institutional context of pension
and disability benefits is very different from that of health care benefits
in at least two ways that are likely to affect a court's interpretation. First,
the health care field is much more institutionally complex. Second, the
importance of defining the proper roles of the government and the
private market is a central, and dynamic, issue in health care policy.
1. Health Care Is Much More Complex, Institutionally
Employer-provided health care plans play an important role in a
very complex system for providing health care, involving numerous
actors whose actions interrelate in complex ways. Employee health care
plans frequently interact directly with patients, providers, government
agencies, and other aspects of the health care system.
One implication of this added complexity and interconnectedness,
for interpretation of section 514, is that it renders the simplistic language
of the section much less determinative in the health care context. Section
514(a)'s statement that ERISA preempts all state and local laws that
92. Id. at 887-88, 911, 921, 950.
93. Id. at 918 ("Where Congress is inattentive and appears to rely on courts for long periods
of time, an irreverent judicial approach to statutory text might be defensible. Where Congress will

correct judicial errors fairly costlessly, formalism is easier to justify.").
94. Id. at 917-18.
95. Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 514 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2006)).
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"relate to" ERISA plans is vague and "unhelpful" in any context, 96 and

even strong textualists admit that it is necessary to go beyond the basic
text. 97 However, the "relate to" language may be sufficiently clear and
determinative in the pension/disability benefits context to justify a
relatively formalistic approach to interpretation-looking at the text and,
perhaps, the legislative history. 98 Thus, we might expect courts
interpreting ERISA preemption in this context to spend little time
looking at background policy considerations or how these have evolved

since the enactment of the statute.
The added complexity of the health care system, however, renders
this simplistic language much more problematic. The interconnectedness
of the system and its different actors makes drawing a line between
statutes that "relate to" ERISA plans and those that do not much more
difficult, simply because the web of potential relationships is so
complex. Thus, while a formalistic approach to section 514 may be

appropriate in other contexts, it is much less practical in the health care
context.
2. The Balance Between the State and the Private Market
In addition to being highly complex, health care policy also raises

difficult issues of the role of the state relative to the private market.
While this tension is certainly not limited to the health care context, it is
particularly acute in this field. In an influential 1963 article, Kenneth
Arrow carefully analyzed the unique economic aspects of health care. 99
96. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 656 (1995) ("We simply must go beyond the unhelpful text and the frustrating difficulty
of defining its key term, and look instead to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the
scope of the state law that Congress understood would survive.").
97. See, e.g., Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519
U.S. 316, 335 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[A]pplying the 'relate to' provision according to its terms
was a project doomed to failure, since, as many a curbstone philosopher has observed, everything is
related to everything else.").
98. We do not here claim that section 514 is in fact sufficiently determinative in the pension
benefit context to justify a textual approach. That is a question outside of the scope of this Article.
We simply cite this example to illustrate the simple fact that different issues arise in the health care
context than do in other contexts.
99. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM.
ECON. REv. 941, 948-54 (1963). Arrow found that two major factors (and a number of other
attributes) make the market for health care unique from other markets. First, in the health care
market it is impossible for parties to efficiently transfer risk; that is, the health insurance market will
necessarily be inefficient, either by failing to insure risks that ought to be insured or over-insuring.
See id at 945, 963-64. "[I]t is impossible to draw up insurance policies which will sufficiently
distinguish among risks, particularly since observation of the results will be incapable of
distinguishing between avoidable and unavoidable risks, so that incentives to avoid losses are
diluted." Id. at 945. Second, the provision of health care involves, to a great extent, the sale of
information, for which there can never be a truly efficient market. See id. at 946-47, 951-52.
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Health care does not fit, Arrow found, into the economic models used to
describe other commodities. 0 0 Private market mechanisms, left to
amount of health care, and
themselves, will fail to provide an efficient
0
the government naturally intervenes.' '
Most scholars have accepted Arrow's basic premise that health care
cannot be treated like other commodities, and that some government
regulation of the industry is inevitable. 102 But there is little agreement on
where the balance between private market mechanisms and government
intervention should rest. 10 3 In terms of actual policy, the balance has
been-and will no doubt continue to be-very dynamic, frequently
and private actors such as
changing due to actions by the government
104
insurers, employers, and physician groups.
When courts are asked to determine whether state and local laws
regulating health care are valid, they are placed at the center of this
complex debate. Because of the dynamic nature of this area, the onesize-fits-all framework that may work in other areas of ERISA
preemption may be undesirable in the health care context. We do not
believe that Congress intended to freeze this balance in place when it
enacted ERISA. Rather, this is an area where, as Eskridge puts it
"original legislative expectations have been [and frequently will be]
overtaken by subsequent changes in society. ' ' With this in mind,
courts are likely to look closely at how a statute treats that balance and
the way in which it allows the government to interact with private
parties.
In short, the generally formalistic approach adopted by many
ERISA scholars, while it may work well in the pension/disability
benefits context, is inadequate to describe ERISA preemption doctrine in
the health care context. Faced with the complexity involved in health
care policy, courts will apply a more dynamic approach, looking at both
the historical context of ERISA's passage and how the statute and health
care policy in general have evolved since its passage. Thus,
100. Id. at 948-54.
101. Id at 947.
102. See, e.g., David S. Bloch & William Robert Nelson, Jr., Defining "Health ": Three Visions
and Their Ramifications, I DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 723, 744 (1997); John E. Schneider &
Robert L. Ohsfeldt, The Role of Markets and Competition in Health Care Reform Initiatives to
Improve Efficiency and Enhance Access to Care, 37 CUMB. L. REv. 479, 504 (2007).
103. See Schneider & Ohsfeldt, supra note 102, at 511 ("The key to improving health care
delivery lies in striking a balance that maximizes all of the benefits of markets and consumer choice
while using the most appropriate and efficient government instruments to extend access to care to
those who want it but cannot afford it.").
104.

(1982).
105.

See generally PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERJCAN MEDICINE

Eskridge, supra note 81, at 1484.
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understanding ERISA's preemption doctrine involves understanding
ERISA as a health policy statute.
IV.

UNDERSTANDING

ERISA AS A HEALTH POLICY STATUTE

To understand ERISA as a health policy statute requires
consideration of both the historical and evolutive contexts of the statute.
First, we suggest that the health benefits provision of ERISA should be
understood in the larger context of the health policy agenda at the time
of its enactment. Our analysis here focuses on the key ideas about the
role of the government and private market mechanisms in the financing
and structure of health care delivery prevalent in the 1970s. Second, we
propose an analysis of how ERISA preemption doctrine has been
implemented by the courts in the health benefit, as opposed to the
retirement benefit, context. Third, we examine directly some of the
health policy implications of ERISA preemption.
A.

FramingHealth Policy in the 1970s

Scholars often see ERISA's inclusion of health care plans as being
a last-minute addition whose implications were not fully thought out.
For example, Jacobson complains about "Congress's failure to give
much thought to the implications of adding health benefits to what was
primarily a pension statute. 10 6 We do not question the traditional
narrative that ERISA was primarily the product of many years of effort
to protect employees' rights to obtain pensions promised by employers.
Pensions and other benefits-not health07 care plans-were undeniably
the primary focus of the ERISA debate.
What our analysis adds to this narrative is the notion that, at the
time ERISA was enacted, Congress and its staff had some overall
concepts of how the nation's health care "problems" should be dealt
with,10 8 and ERISA's inclusion of health care benefits within its scope
was not inconsistent with those concepts. The idea that ERISA's
preemption scope is consistent with Congress' ideas about general health
policy is strengthened by the fact that, despite passing a number of
amendments to ERISA itself, Congress has not attempted to clarify the
basic scope of preemption. 109
Thus, understanding ERISA preemption as it applies to health care
statutes involves understanding Congress' ideas about health care at the
106.
107.
108.
109.

Jacobson, supra note 8, at 91.
See id.at 89.
STARR, supranote 104, at 382-83.
See Jacobson, supranote 8, at 91.
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time ERISA was passed. We begin our analysis with an institutional
question: What was the health care policy and legal landscape in the
early 1970s when Congress enacted ERISA? The health policy agenda at
this time was driven by a need to control health care costs. 1i It was
generally accepted that the rising cost of health care in the United States
had reached crisis level."' Public spending on health care was going up
drastically.1 2 Much of this spending, it was generally recognized, was
wasteful-a product of the distorted incentives created by Medicare,
Medicaid, and private insurance practices. 113
While many Democrats hoped to deal with the problems of rising
cost by greater governmental control of medical care, or even a
nationalized health insurance system, 1 4 the solution that was finally
enacted was a compromise that used both public and private mechanisms
to control costs. The federal Health Maintenance Organization Act of
1973 ("HMO Act"), 115 a compromise bill passed by a Democratic
Congress and signed by Richard Nixon, was designed to encourage the
development of HMOs and to encourage employers to offer HMOs to
their employees. 116 HMOs' strong incentive to limit costs, it was hoped,
would reverse the perverse incentives inherent in the system and thus
bring down costs. "7 This represents an attempt to control costs through
federal incentives to private institutions for restructuring the financing
and organization of health care delivery." 8 Even though managed care
did not become a dominant form of financing and delivery of health care
until after the failed Clinton reforms,"19 we should not ignore the
significance of this incremental HMO legislation. The political process
had produced a largely private alternative to the Democratic Party's goal
of universal health care access through public programs.
110.
111.

STARR, supra note 104, at 383-84.
Seeid.at383.

112. Id. at 384 ("[Between 1965 and 1970, the government's] share of national health
expenditures jumped from 26 to 37 percent ....In that same period, the annual rate of increase in
state and federal health expenditures was 20.8 percent. The $10.8 billion government had spent in
1965 became $27.8 billion by 1970.").
113. Id.at384-88.
114. Id.at394.
115. Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300(e) et seq.).
116.

ESTHER UYEHARA & MARGARET THOMAS, HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION AND

THE HMO ACT OF 1973, at 3 (1975), http://www.rc.rand.org/pubs/papers/2009/P5554.pdf;
Presidential Statement on Signing the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 1973 PUB.
PAPERS 1029 (Dec. 29, 1973), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/?pid=4092.
117. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 402 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he genesis of HMOs[] stemmed from spiraling health costs."); UYEHARA &
THOMAS, supra note 116, at 10.
118. See JAMES W. HENDERSON, HEALTH ECONOMICS & POLICY 206 (2d ed. 2002).
119. Id.
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Efforts to use private market mechanisms to increase health care
coverage continued after the passage of the HMO Act. In February 1974,
President Nixon sent Congress a message outlining a plan for a
Comprehensive Health Insurance Plan. 120 One of the key features of his
plan was that "[e]very employer would be required to offer all full-time
employees the Comprehensive Health Insurance Plan."' 2 1 President
Nixon furthered distinguished his approach from other proposals: "My
proposed plan differs sharply with several of the other health insurance
plans which have been prominently discussed. The primary difference is
that my proposal would rely extensively on private insurers."'' 2 2 Of
course, President Nixon's political disgrace and his subsequent
resignation meant there was no specific debate about his proposal.' 23 But
this does not mean that the underlying notion of using federal law to
provide incentives for the private market to increase access and control
costs did not pervade congressional thinking about what was politically
feasible and appropriate health policy.
It seems reasonable to assume that when Congress enacted ERISA,
including the language bringing employee health benefit plans within a
regulatory structure for employee retirement plans, Congress had in
mind the same policy considerations that it had used when enacting the
HMO Act the previous year. Put another way, exempting federally
regulated employee benefit plans from state regulation is consistent with
the ideology of market forces as the drivers of health reform
that was a
24
significant part of the policy debate in the early 1970s. 1
B.

The Courts'Implementationof ERISA Preemption

In addition to the historical context in which ERISA was enacted,
insight can be gained by looking at court decisions interpreting ERISA.
In doing so, however, it is important to avoid attempting to resolve
alleged inconsistencies in various courts' interpretations without
considering the context and health policy background of those decisions.

120. Special Message to the Congress Proposing a Comprehensive Health Insurance Plan,
1974 PUB. PAPERS 132 (Feb. 6, 1974), htp://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2009/September/

03/nixon-proposal.aspx.
121.

Id.at 134.

122. Id. at 138.
123. CATHERINE HOFFMAN, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., NATIONAL HEALTH
INSURANCE-A BRIEF HISTORY OF REFORM EFFORTS IN THE U.S. 6 (2009), available at

http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/787I .pdf.
124. At least one Supreme Court decision has referred to the HMO Act in attempting to discern
Congress' intent in enacting ERISA. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 36769 (2002).
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It is beyond the scope of this Article to do a comprehensive history
or evaluation of ERISA case law. Rather, this Article suggests a method
for such evaluation. We will examine only two Supreme Court cases,
decided three years apart. These cases, District of Columbia v. Greater
Washington Board of Trade125 and New York State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co., 126 give us certain
insights about the importance of looking at institutional background
when examining ERISA case law.
1. Greater Washington Board of Trade
Greater Washington Board of Trade involves a District of
Columbia ordinance that required any employer who provided health
insurance coverage to an employee to continue to offer the same level of
coverage while that employee received workers' compensation

benefits. 127
The district court hearing the case found that the law was not
preempted. 128 The district court concluded that an employer could, if it
so chose, comply with the statute without altering its ERISA plans "by
creating a separate administrative unit to administer the required
benefits."'' 29 The statute did not require employers to alter their ERISAcovered health plans. 130 Rather, employers only had to alter the way they
administered workers compensation plans-which were not covered by
ERISA. 131Therefore, the statute was not preempted.
The Supreme Court, however, followed a different line of reasoning
that more fully accounted for general health policy considerations.
Although the Court did not disagree with the factual assertion that an
employer could comply with the statute without altering its ERISA
plans, it pointed out that the amount of coverage an employer is required
to give an employee on workers' compensation is "measured by
reference" to the amount of health care coverage the employer chooses
was sufficient to bring the
to provide its employees. 3 2 Such a reference 33
1
scope.
preemptive
ERISA's
ordinance within

125.

506 U.S. 125 (1992).

126.

514 U.S. 645 (1994).

127.

Greater Washington, 506 U.S. at 127-28.

128.

id. at 128.

129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 130.

133. Id. at 130-31.
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The decision is best understood, we believe, by looking at how the
statute actually affected employers' "choice architecture"'' 34 in light of
health policy considerations. There has long been a general policy in the
United States of encouraging employers to move some compensation
from direct payment to health care benefits. Tax laws, for example, do
this by exempting that compensation from taxation.1 35 ERISA attempts
to do this by limiting remedies and providing a uniform benefit structure.
It seems likely that the Court had this policy in mind when it made
its decision. The Court realized that the D.C. statute created incentives
that ran directly contrary to this policy. Under the statute, an employer
deciding whether and how to provide benefits would have to consider
that it would be required to continue paying those benefits if the
employee ended up receiving workers' compensation. By imposing an
extra burden on those employers who choose to supply health care
benefits, the statute might dissuade some employers from offering those
benefits or encourage them to offer a lower level of benefits.
Looking at these policy issues also helps to explain why the Court
is not persuaded by the reasoning in Justice Stevens' dissent. Justice
Stevens pointed out that an injured worker's compensation had
traditionally been "measured by [the employee's] entire loss of
earnings-including the value of fringe benefits such as health
insurance."' 136 By ensuring that employees continued to receive all
benefits, including health care benefits, after an injury, the statute merely
sought to ensure that this practice continued. 137 Under this
characterization, the statute did not single out employee health care
plans for special treatment-which would have subjected it to ERISA
preemption. 13 8 Rather, the statute sought to ensure that health plans
would be treated the same as other compensation. t39
Such reasoning seems persuasive at first glance. However, when
one considers the statute not only on its own terms, but in light of
background policy concerns, the majority's reason for rejecting this
position becomes clear. As pointed out above, part of the health care
policy framework that had been prevalent for decades in the United
140
States was to encourage employers to offer health care plans.
Contrary to Justice Stevens' assumption, all forms of compensation are

134.
135.
136.

See discussion infra Part III.C.1.
See I.R.C. § 106(a) (2006).
Greater Washington, 506 U.S. at 133 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

137. Id. at 137.
138. Id.

139. Id. at 134.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 134-35.
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not to be treated the same. Health benefits are to be encouraged, and thus
receive special treatment.
2. Travelers
Travelers dealt with a New York statute that regulated the rate that
hospitals charged patients or their insurers. 14 1 The statute required
hospitals to use prospective payment, charging not for the actual cost of
treatment that an individual receives, but for the average cost of treating
someone with the patient's medical problem. 142 In addition to this
to all
average cost, hospitals were required to charge a surcharge
143
plans.
employer
self-funded
including
insurers,
commercial
Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans (the "Blues") were exempt from this
surcharge, however. 144 These charge differentials were justified because
"the Blues pay the hospitals promptly and efficiently and, more
importantly, provide coverage for many subscribers whom the
commercial insurers would reject as unacceptable risks." 145 The purpose
of the differentials, then, seems to have been to subsidize the Blues, who
were performing a public service and relieving the public of expenses by
insuring those whose health care might otherwise have fallen to the
state. 146

The plaintiffs were several commercial insurers and labor groups
who claimed that the price differentials affected ERISA plans to such an
extent that they were preempted by ERISA. 147 The lower court agreed,
stating that although the surcharges' effect on ERISA plans was indirect,
there was "little doubt that the [s]urcharges... will have a significant
effect on the commercial insurers." 148 In particular, the lower court
found it significant that the "entire justification for the [s]urcharges" was
to encourage employers and individuals to choose the Blues over other
insurers. 149
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that, while the statute would
likely influence employers'
choices, its influence was too indirect to
150
warrant preemption.

141.
645, 649
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 506 U.S.
(1995).
Id.
Id. at 650.
Id. at 649.
Id. at 658.
Id. at 659 n.5.
Id. at 651.
Id. at 652 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 662.
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At least two policy implications can be derived from the Court's
decision. First, it tells us something about how ERISA preemption
relates to choice architecture. The Court took pains to point out that the
51
statute "does not bind plan administrators to any particular choice[,]" 1
but leaves them free to choose among a number of plans. The fact that
the statute incentivized one plan over another did not cause it to be

preempted. 152
Looked at in comparison with Greater Washington Board of Trade,
this decision is, at first glance, somewhat confusing. Greater
Washington Board of Trade also dealt with a statute that only indirectly
incentivized certain actions. In fact, it could easily be argued that the
incentive in Travelers was both stronger and more intentional than that
in Greater Washington Board of Trade. Why then, would one incentive
be preempted while another, stronger one, would not?
The answer seems to lie not simply in how "strong" or how "direct"
the incentive is, but in how well the incentive comports with general
health policy implications. As pointed out above, the incentive in
Greater Washington Board of Trade conflicted with an important part of
the nation's health policy framework-encouraging employers to offer
health plans. 153 The incentive in Travelers, on the other hand, comports
much more smoothly with general health policy concerns. Specifically,
the price differentials are designed to encourage and support the Blues,
which in turn, at that particular time when the Blues in New York were a
not-for-profit organization,
provided an important public service by
54
1
uninsured.
the
insuring
A second insight to be gained from Travelers is that the Court may
look more favorably upon regulations that are fully integrated into a
more general health policy reform. The disputed provision was part of a
more general statute that required hospitals to use prospective payment

151. 1dat659-60.
152. Id. at 662.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 135-36.
154. See James C. Robinson, The Curious Conversion of Empire Blue Cross, 22 HEALTH AFF.
100, 101, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/22/4/100.full.pdf (explaining that
Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield of New York converted to for-profit status on November 7, 2002);
CoordinatedIssue Paper-Blue Cross Blue Shield/HealthInsurance; Life Insurance, IRS.GOV (June

4, 2008), http://www.irs.gov/businesses/article/0,,id=183646,00.html ("Prior to June 1994, the
Association's membership standards and licensing agreements required that its member licensees be
nonprofit organizations" and "[iln general, the plans were organized... under special legislation
requiring that the plan operate on a nonprofit basis and declaring it a 'charitable and benevolent
institution."'). Incentives toward one particular for-profit health insurance carrier would likely not
be viewed as legitimate health policy. See Robinson, supra, at 115 (explaining that after converting
to for-profit status, Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield of New York now has the same obligations to
New York State as its competitors).
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rather than charge for the actual cost of services. The statute seems to
have been designed to divorce the amount that hospitals charged from
the expenses they actually incurred155 on a given procedure-thus
encouraging hospitals to control costs.

Although the Court does not list this as a specific reason that the
statute survives preemption, the Court does express concern with
extending ERISA preemption so far that it could "displace general health
care regulation, which historically has been a matter of local
concern." 156 It seems that part of the Court's hesitancy to interfere with
the charge differentials in the New York statute is that the differentials
formed an integral part of a general health care statute.
3. Institutional Capacity and the Failure of Clinton Health Care
It is important to note one final piece of background that may have
affected the outcomes in Greater Washington Board of Trade and
Travelers. In 1992, when Greater Washington Board of Trade was
decided, the prospect for federal health care reform seemed high.
President Bill Clinton had recently been elected, having campaigned
largely on health care reform. In this situation, where the federal
government appeared ready to take a more active role in regulating
health care, the Court may have been more likely to look at individual
state regulation as interference.
By 1995, however, President Clinton's health care proposals had
failed, and the prospect for federal reforms looked much dimmer. With
the federal government assuming a hands-off approach, the Court was
likely to be much more tolerant of individual states' attempts to address
their individual health care crises.
We have already seen that courts' interpretive methods adapt to
specific health policy concerns. Here, we see an example of the Court's
interpretive method adapting to changes in the institutional capacity of
the other branches. When the Court perceived the political branches as
being both capable of and active in dealing with policy question, it was
reluctant to step in with a statutory interpretation that might interfere
with these institutions' attempts to resolve problems. When, on the other
hand, it seemed clear that the political branches were unable to deal with
health care problems, the Court was more willing to step in and attempt
to correct problems itself. 57
'
155.

In fact, the rise of "prospective payment" systems has been tied directly to the medical

cost crisis that led to the HMO Act. See Rick Mayes, The Origins, Development, and Passageof
Medicare'sRevolutionaryProspectivePayment System, 62 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED SC. 31 (2007).
156. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 661.

157.

See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
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C.

Some Policy Implications of ERISA Preemption

Our analysis of both the historical context in which ERISA was
passed and the contexts in which it has been implemented by the courts
suggests certain policy implications. We do not need to enter the debate
about whether the preemption doctrine is, or normatively should be,
narrowly or broadly construed by the courts. Rather, we suggest the
courts should treat ERISA preemption, in conjunction with the HMO
Act and other developments, as part of an institutional experiment 158 in
utilizing the private market-particularly employers-to help contain
health care costs.
We call this an institutional experiment because the actual effect of
legal intervention into the health care market was, and to some degree
still is, unknown. For instance, President Nixon and his cohort were just
starting to realize the fiscal effects of Medicare and Medicaid on state
and federal budgets, not to mention the inflationary aspects of Medicare
on the private cost of health care.
Under this experimental metaphor for the ERISA doctrine, whether
or not a particular state incentive or disincentive is preempted by ERISA
depends upon the institutional context in which an employer is asked to
respond to the state incentive. In essence, the relevant question is
whether a given statute continues the experiment or interferes with it.
The statute in Greater Washington Board of Trade interfered with this
experiment, while the statute in Travelers helped to further it.
An understanding of ERISA preemption, then, involves
understanding the specific policy concepts that form this health care
"experiment." We list here two such policy implications that seem to
arise from the historical factors and cases we have discussed so far. This
is far from an exhaustive list, however, and one could no doubt find a
number of policy implications not discussed here.
1. Creating a Choice Architecture
While ERISA does not mandate that employers provide certain
benefits, it does provide certain incentives for employers to provide
quality health care. For example, it ensures that the liability employers
assume in providing health care will be limited by prescribing specific
and limited remedies, and it attempts to lower the cost to multistate
159
employers of providing such benefits through increased uniformity.

158.

See Larry I. Palmer, Research with Human Subjects as a Paradigmfor Teaching, 16 L.

MED. & HEALTH CARE 183, 187-88 (1988) (suggesting the application of "institutional
experiments" to teaching and learning).
159. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 105 (1983).
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Thus, an important part of the ERISA experiment is an attempt to
influence 0 the direction of, without directly interfering with, the private
market. 16
Richard Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein describe the ability of legal
institutions to create a "choice architecture"--encouraging, without
mandating, certain choices. 161 The ideal form of this choice architecture
is "libertarian patemalism"-encouraging and incentivizing certain
62
actions while neither prohibiting nor unduly burdening other choices. 1
We might characterize the complex policy structure of federal,
state, and local incentives and disincentives as presenting employers
with a specific choice architecture. ERISA preemption plays an
important role in this by ensuring that local laws do not unduly interfere
with private employers' choices. This scheme, if not entirely
"libertarian" paternalism, at least discourages direct coercion of
employers by states. States are allowed to create laws that influence the
choices of employers, such as encouraging them to provide benefits.
However, state governments are severely limited in their ability to
dictate certain results or certain benefits. The employers' ability to make
certain choices is protected by ERISA preemption.
2. Defining the Role of Private Actors and the Government
As discussed above, another important aspect of the ERISA
experiment is utilizing the private market to reduce health care costs and
increase coverage. 163 ERISA's preemption provision can be seen as
playing an important role in maintaining the balance between the private
market and the states. Specifically, ERISA's preemption provision gives
the courts some ability to oversee state laws that interfere with the
private market mechanisms that ERISA seeks to encourage. ERISA thus
gives courts an important role in "the essential and difficult tasks of
determining the extent of market and government roles."'64
Thus courts, in examining statutes challenged under ERISA, will be
concerned not only with how the statute operates in isolation, but how it

160. Whether and to what extent ERISA has been successful at encouraging employers to offer
health care benefits is a question beyond the scope of this Article. Peter Jacobson notes that "[m]any
observers and stakeholders credit ERISA preemption with facilitating the growth of managed care
and allowing large employers to develop national coverage arrangements for employees." Jacobson,
supranote 8, at 89.
161. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
162. Id. at 5.
163. See supranote 158 and accompanying text.
164. NEAL K. KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF
RIGHTS 167 (2001).
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relates to other health care provisions. If the statute merely focuses on a
single side of the equation, such as employer contributions, courts are
more likely to find that the statute is incompatible with the ERISA
experiment. If, on the other hand, the statute creates a scheme involving
a role for both private actors and the state, the courts are likely to uphold
the statute.
V.

THE FOURTH AND NINTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS UNDER THIS
FRAMEWORK

By looking at ERISA preemption through the lens of the policy
concerns described above, we can make more sense of the different
outcomes in Fielder and Golden Gate. At least three possible
explanations for the different outcomes in the two cases arise-one
based on choice architecture, one based on the role of the market and the
state, and another based on concerns about institutional capacity.
A.

Choice Architecture

In evaluating the respective statutes, both courts focused heavily on
the choice architecture that the statute presented employers. The Fielder
Court specifically distinguishes between statutes that "effectively
mandate[] some element of the structure or administration of employers'
ERISA plans" and those that "create[] only indirect economic incentives
that affect but do not bind the choices of employers."' 65 The court's
decision focuses on whether66the Fair Share Act falls into the "incentive"
or the "mandate" category.1
The court found that employers' choices under the statute were so
limited that the Fair Share Act constituted a mandate. 167 The court
examined the alternative means for complying with the Fair Share Actcontributions to health savings accounts, on-site clinics, and the statepayment option-and dismissed them all as red herrings. 68 The Fair
Share Act created a choice architecture designed to lead employers to
choice: increasing health insurance provided to
one specific
69
employees. 1
Of course, the court did not address how it would have analyzed the
Fair Share Act had it left employers with more choices. The implication,
165.

Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 193 (4th Cir. 2007) (emphasis

added).
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 197.
Id. at 196-97.
Id.
Id. at 193.
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however, is that the analysis, and perhaps the conclusion, would have
been very different. The court implicitly recognizes that state statutes
may validly affect the choice architecture under which employers
operate. State statutes may not, however, remove or severely limit an
employer's choices.
The dissenting judge, Judge Michael, similarly focuses on choice
architecture-although he bases his analysis on a different factual
conclusion. Judge Michael does not see the state-payment option as an
unrealistic alternative. 7 0 Rather, he sees it as a "real" choice that WalMart might conceivably choose. 171
The Golden Gate opinion also focused on choice architecture. In
upholding the San Francisco ordinance, the court emphasized that the
ordinance gives wide latitude to employers and does not bind them to
any specific outcome.1 72 In describing the effect the ordinance has on
employers, the court conspicuously emphasized that employers have
choices.173 "A covered employer may choose to adopt or to change an
ERISA plan .... An employer may be influenced by the Ordinance to
do so

....

174 However, an employer may also "fully discharge its

expenditure
obligations
by
making
the
required
level
75
of... expenditures... in whole or in part to the City."'
And if
employers do choose to offer benefits, they
"may
structur[e]
their
176
employee benefit plans in a variety of ways."'
Furthermore, in distinguishing Fielder,the Ninth Circuit's opinion
focused almost exclusively on the difference in choice architecture
between the two ordinances. 177 The Maryland ordinance, while it
nominally had a "state-payment" option, gave employers no realistic
alternative.17 8 The Maryland law was "intended to 'force Wal-Mart to
increase its spending on healthcare benefits"' and "[u]nlike the
Maryland law, the San Francisco Ordinance provides
nearly all
179
employers within the city with a legitimate alternative."'

170. Id. at 202 (Michael, J., dissenting).
171. Id.
172. Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 546 F.3d 639, 655 (9th Cir. 2008) ("The
Ordinance does not require any employer to adopt an ERISA plan or other health plan. Nor does it
require any employer to provide specific benefits through an existing ERISA plan or other health
plan.").
173. Id. at 655-56.
174. Id. at 656 (emphasis added).
175. Id. at 655-56.
176. Id. at 656 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
177. Id. at 659-61.
178. Id. at 660.
179. Id. (quoting Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 185 (4th Cir. 2007)).
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The Provision'sFunction in Defining the Role of Government and
PrivateActors

San Francisco's employer "mandate," looked at in the broader
context of the reforms created by the HCSO, reveals a complex
relationship between the government and employers. While the
ordinance certainly requires employers to make an increased
contribution to health care costs, it does not do so in isolation, but in the
context of general health care reform. For example, employers'
contributions interact directly with the HAP in providing health care for
employees. In this sense, the HCSO is similar to the statute in Travelers.
These statutes are not focused simply on increasing employer
contributions, but on increasing the provision of health care and defining
its structure.
Maryland's Fair Share Act, on the other hand, did nothing to define
the role of the government and only defined the role of the market for a
single employer, Wal-Mart. Whereas the San Francisco employer
mandate is integrated into a wider attempt to define the role of the
government and employers, the Maryland ordinance seems more
isolated and punitive-requiring a single employer to shoulder a greater
burden.
Thus, if ERISA is looked at, partially, as an experiment in defining
the roles of the government and private employers in providing health
care, the HCSO does much more to further that experiment than does the
Fair Share Act.
C. Concernsfor InstitutionalCapacity
As discussed above, the courts are also influenced by their
perceptions of their own institutional capacity as compared to that of the
other branches. 180 This may explain the difference of opinion between
the dissent and the majority in Fielder. The majority in Fielderseem to
feel that the institutional capacity of the courts to address health policy
concerns is low. While it recognizes Maryland's "noble purpose" in
enacting the Fair Share Act,i 88 it refuses to consider the basic policy
behind the Fair Share Act or the problems facing Maryland that led to it.
In his dissent, Judge Michael seems to feel more comfortable with
the institutional capacity of the courts to evaluate the policy concerns
behind the Fair Share Act. He begins his analysis, not with a discussion
of ERISA case law, but with several pages describing the Medicaid
180. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
181. Fielder,475 F.3d at 198.
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crisis that led Maryland to enact the Fair Share Act. 182 These different
interpretive styles arise from different views of the capacity of the courts
to answer policy questions.
Concerns about institutional capacity may also have influenced the
Supreme Court's decision not to grant certiorari in Golden Gate. On
May 26, 2010, the United States filed an amicus brief recommending
that the Court deny certiorari. 183 The brief emphasized that, in the wake
of the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
("ACA"), the balance between the private market and the states has yet
to be "fleshed out."' 84 In particular, "[t]he new legislation contemplates
a significant role for the States in promoting the availability of health
care coverage."' 185 The Solicitor General points out that, prior to the
enactment of the ACA, the Department of Labor had been considering
promulgating regulation to help clarify the scope of ERISA in relation to
state reforms. 186 However, the Department now considered regulatory
action to be premature and was waiting for the contours and effects of
the new health reform legislation to become clearer. 87 By emphasizing
that the executive branch was actively pursuing the issue, the Solicitor
General seems to be suggesting that the Court should defer to the
political branches and the market.
It seems likely that the Court chose not to review Golden Gate for
the very reasons the Solicitor General suggests. After the passage of the
ACA, the federal and state governments are newly empowered to define
the direction of health care policy-while the courts have little
information about the actual effects of the new law on private parties. It
seems likely that the Court perceived the institutional capacity of the
political branches to be relatively high, with the capacity of the courts
being relatively low. Under these circumstances, the Court decided to
stand back-allowing the political branches to determine the contours of
the new health policy before interfering.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In the wake of the passage of the ACA, much about the landscape
of health care policy has changed dramatically. Underlying policies
182.
183.

Id.at 198-200 (Michael, J., dissenting).
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City & Cnty. of

S.F., 130 S. Ct. 3497 (2010) (No. 08-1515).

184. Id. at 15 ("The full contours and effects of many aspects of the new federal framework
therefore remain to be fleshed out.").
185.

Id.

186. Seeid. at 12.
187. Id.at 13-14.
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about the role of the state and private actors, the incentives under which
employers operate, and the institutional capacity of the courts and
political branches, will change.
This fact makes understanding the type of analysis we have
employed here particularly important. If, as we have argued, courts'
interpretations of ERISA take into account a broad range of factors,
including policy issues and the courts' perception of their own
institutional capacity, then the ACA is likely to have a major effect on
ERISA preemption doctrine.
We do not here analyze the specifics of how the ACA will affect
preemption analysis. At this point, such an analysis would necessarily be
preliminary and speculative. We suggest, however, that scholars
attempting to explain ERISA preemption in the future, and how it is
affected by both the passage of the ACA and other developments, need
to understand the role of health policy concerns in ERISA preemption
analysis.

